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SPEECH LOCKED UP: JOHN LOCKE, LIBERALISM AND THE 
REGULATION OF SPEECH 
By 
Alex Daniel 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 
In his seminal work discussing the development, utility and application of the liberal 
science, Jonathan Rauch held that John Locke was the "father of liberalism itself," whose 
arguments in favor of the social contract theory and the rectitude of constitutional, republican 
government underscored not simply the rise of liberal democracy, but also the rise of liberal 
epistemology."1 Yet Jeremy Waldron, a professor of law and noted advocate of hate speech 
regulations, claimed Locke as his intellectual forbearer and concluded that in a Lockean world, 
the government would be required to regulate abuses of speech. Nevertheless, neither Rauch nor 
Waldron fully manages to capture Locke's position on free speech. Waldron entirely 
misinterprets Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration by reading it in a vacuum and failing to 
observe Locke's rejection of government interference with fundamental liberties. While Rauch 
is correct in concluding that Locke would be opposed restrictions on an absolute right to free 
speech, his reasoning is fails to account for Locke's strong belief in individual autonomy. While 
Locke would certainly agree with Rauch that absolute speech rights are necessary to ensure the 
1 JONATHAN RAUCH, KINDLY INQUISITORS 59 (1993). Rauch is an advocate ofwhat he has term ''the liberal 
science," a form of social organization in which individuals enjoy a virtually unregulated right to free speech apart 
from the provisos that no one person can claim a special authority over knowledge such that they cannot be 
questioned and that no idea is beyond scrutiny. Rauch bases this position on the observation that a world in which 
all people enjoy the same unlimited right to speak, knowledge will be arrived at by a means of public discourse 
wherein all ideas are continuously vetted and subject to constant review. In light of this, Rauch concludes that 
society benefits from speech that is hateful or obnoxious to the extent that it causes individuals to constantly 
scrutinize their own positions, preventing knowledge from going stale and denying any one person the opportunity 
to declare themselves the fmal arbiter of knowledge. 
orderly and efficient discovery of knowledge, the true basis for Locke's rejection of speech 
regulation derives from his belief in inherent individual liberty-for Locke, speech was not 
simply a means to arrive at the truth, but rather it was an absolute right guaranteed to citizens by 
virtue of their status of autonomous, individual beings living in a free society. 
According to Rauch, Locke's advocacy for modem constitutional government was not a 
coincidence, but rather stemmed from Locke's epistemological belief that the key to a stable 
society was not stasis, but rather social and intellectual dynamism. 2 Although Rauch noted that 
the connection between Locke's epistemology and Locke's political philosophies was never 
made textually explicit by Locke himself, Rauch argued that there was an implicit connection in 
light of Locke's laissez-faire positions on both epistemology and government.3 According to 
Rauch, the liberal science is not merely a method of discerning truth by means of public 
discourse, social consensus and intellectual scrutiny, but rather it is a way of ordering society 
such that the scrutiny of ideas is welcome, restrictions on speech and discussion are abolished 
and no individual can claim the singular right to declare truth and knowledge. 4 The crux of 
Rauch's theory of liberal science hinges on two essential positions: first, no one has the fmal say 
on what is true, and second, no one has any personal or superior authority in determining what is 
or is not the truth. 5 The first tenet, the absence of final say, derives from philosophical 
skepticism and holds that because there can never be certainty in knowledge, all ideas are subject 
to scrutiny, and "no one can legitimately claim to have ended any discussion--ever."6 The 
second tenet, against personal authority, holds that because all people are prone to error in their 
belief or judgments, "no one can legitimately claim to be above being checked by others ... " and 
2 ld. 
3 Id. 
4 ld. at 45-47. 
5 ld. at46. 
6 ld. 
as a result, "no one can claim to have any unique or personal powers to decide who is right or 
who is wrong." 7 
Rauch observed that these two tenets were apparent in the epistemological and 
philosophical writings of John Locke. 8 Rauch found that Locke's inherent fallibilist skepticism 
and belief in the "mutual ignorance" of mankind indicated Locke's belief in a public means for 
selecting truth in which men, by means of their shared capacity for reason, seek to persuade each 
other in an environment steeped in mental equity.9 However, Rauch concluded that Locke's 
skepticism of self-claimed intellectual authority and belief in the uncertainty of human 
knowledge did not simply support a liberal epistemology, but also a liberal society in which men 
were free to engage in public discourse free from government regulation and to pick leaders by 
means of a constitutional, republican government. 10 Rauch connected Locke's belief in the 
social contract to his epistemology and found that in a Lockean world, speech would ultimately 
be free from government regulation and public restriction. 11 Rauch concluded that in a Lockean 
world, social and political systems would be ordered to promote the free exercise of speech and 
the toleration of the expression of any and all ideas and opinions, even those deemed offensive, 
hateful or dangerous. 12 Rauch found that in a Lockean society, "Nazis, Communists, [and] 
racists" are free to express their views because they may be right, and even if they are not right, 
hearing their views helps those who oppose them refine their opinions and prevents their 
knowledge from becoming stale. 13 Yet while Rauch finds the Locke agrees with the tenets of the 
liberal science, Rauch fails to articulate or explain Locke's view that certain rights are simply 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 ld. at 59-60. 
10 ld. 
II Id. 
12 Id. at 60. 
13 ld. 
guaranteed to human beings by virtue of the individual autonomy. Rauch's positivist position 
denies the reality that Locke's opposition to speech regulation has a basis in his normative belief 
that all human beings have certain inalienable rights that are simply beyond the scope of 
government's authority to regulate. 
Reading the same texts and observing the same history, Jeremy Waldron drew a 
dichotomous conclusion about speech in a Lockean world: it could and should be regulated to 
promote civil discourse, free from the hyperbolic and the vituperative.14 Waldron found that in 
reading Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration, strains of thought could be parsed that supported 
the conclusion that in a civil society, regulations and laws were necessary to ensure that 
individuals and groups were not excluded from the process of public discourse by those who 
used "furious vituperations" to frighten and isolate opponents. 15 Although Locke's Letter 
Concerning Toleration dealt heavily with the concept of using the coercive force of the state to 
convert individuals to a single religious belief, Waldron concludes that Locke supported a vision 
of a society in which people engaged in speech free from "fiery zeal" and hateful, virulent 
words. 16 Waldron noted that Locke opposed the use of coercion to promote beliefs, and 
concluded that Locke did not simply oppose the coercive force of government in bringing about 
conversion, but also the use of"attacks on people's honor, as well as ... attacks on their person 
and property" by anyone in supporting different religious beliefs. 17 To this extent, Waldron 
found that three central themes pervaded Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration. First, "public 
expressions of hatred and vilification were typical of an intolerant rather than tolerant society. 18 
Second, individuals have a duty, both moral and legal, to avoid the usage of"rough words" and 
14 JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM 1N HATE SPEECH 210-13 (20 12). 
IS Id. 
16 Id. 
17 ld. at 212. 
18 Id. at 213-14. 
actions against those with whom they disagree if those words are calculated to have a damning 
effect on the life, honor or property of their opponent. 19 Lastly, Waldron found that Locke 
bound up his belief in the need for a tolerant society free from hateful speech in the affirmative 
duty of men to share in charity with others, thus creating an affirmative duty to protect and 
promote peace in a diverse society.20 
It seems impossible that two men could read the same texts, yet draw virtually 
dichotomous opinions on the political and intellectual teachings of John Locke. Rauch finds in 
Locke a supporter of not only laissez-faire economics, but laissez-faire speech and thinking, 
concluding that in a Lockean world there would be no regulation on the use of speech, hateful or 
otherwise. Waldron concludes that Locke is much more moderate in his stand on speech 
regulation, and to the extent that Locke opposes coercion by any group against another, argues 
that Locke would support laws that promoted public discourse free from hate speech. This 
Comment addresses the dichotomous positions held by Rauch and Waldron with regards to the 
regulation of speech in a Lockean world. This Comment is not intended to support or decry the 
positions held by Locke, but rather assumes, arguendo, that Locke's conclusions are correct, his 
reasoning sound, and parses his work to determine whether he would support the regulation of 
hate speech or denounce any attempt by government to restrict the free exercise of speech. Part 
II of this comment will provide a brief history of John Locke, focusing on the political and social 
context in which he drafted his principle works. Part III will examine Locke's epistemology and 
will conclude that Locke shares Rauch's belief in the major axioms of liberal science. Part IV 
will explore Locke's moral and political writings, in particular his opposition to hereditary, 
absolutist monarchies and his conceptualization the autonomous individual in a free society. Part 
19 ld. 
20 Id. at 214-15. 
IV will conclude that Locke supports an absolute right to free speech and that his stemmed not 
simply from his nascent approval of the tenets of liberal science, as concluded by Rauch, but also 
his belief that certain rights are ultimately inalienable and thus beyond the power of the 
government to regulate. Part V will address Locke's position on tolerance in a free society and 
will conclude that Locke's chief concern in his work A Letter Concerning Toleration was the 
wrongful use of force by both government and individuals to regulate the moral sentiment and 
expressions of moral sentiment held by others. Part V will reject Waldron's contention that 
Locke would support government regulation of hate speech, and will demonstrate that a Lockean 
society would not suffer content based restrictions. Part VI will conclude by rejecting Waldron's 
specious reading of Locke, and by supporting Rauch's initial claim that Locke was the father of 
liberalism and an opponent to speech regulation. However, Part VI will end by stating that 
Locke's opposition to hate speech regulation would stem not simply from his support of the 
basic tenets the liberal science, but also his belief in the inherent rights of autonomous people to 
express their beliefs free from unlawful restrictions. 
PART II: LOCKE IN HIS LIFETIME 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Locke developed his liberal epistemology, moral philosophy and 
political ideology in the midst of crisis. Locke was born to a family of extremely minor gentry-
his father, a landed property owner, held small posts in local government and served as in the 
parliamentary armies during the English Civil War.21 While natural philosophy was the subject 
of some of Locke's study, his education chiefly centered on the study of analytical medical 
science. 22 It was during this period that Locke developed his much lauded belief in empiricism 
21 J.R. Milton, Locke's life and times, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LOCKE 5, 5 (Vere Chappell ed. 1994). 
22 Id. at 9. 
and the need for observable facts and demonstrable fmdings to prove truth.23 It was Locke's 
chance introduction to Lord Shaftsb~4 in 1666 that would begin Locke's interest in moral and 
political philosophy.25 Shaftsbury was a member of the radical wing of the British Whig party, 
and an opponent to King Charles II and his son James II, a Catholic who was suspected by the 
Whigs of plotting to return England to the Catholic faith.26 Beginning in 1679, Shaftsbury and 
his Whig compatriots in parliament made numerous attempts to exclude James from the English 
throne, but each attempt proved fruitless as King Charles simply dissolved the parliament each 
time a bill was passed that threatened to remove James from the order ofsuccession.27 
Shaftsbury's efforts would ultimately culminate in his 1683 flight from London and his death 
while in hiding.28 It was during the period between 1679 and Shaftsbury's death in 1683 that 
most scholars agree Locke wrote his work the Two Treatises of Government, Locke's foremost 
piece describing the need for limited, republican government in a free and civilized world?9 The 
First Treatise was written in opposition to Thomas Filmer's Patriarcha, a text which advocated 
absolutist, hereditary, divine-right monarchies as the only legitimate form of government. The 
Second Treatise was likely written during the peak of Shaftsbury's efforts to exclude James II 
23 ld. at 9-10. 
24 For an illuminating piece discussing the relationship between Locke and Shaftsbury see J.R. Milton and Philip 
Milton, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION 1, 1-11 (J.R. Milton & Philip Milton 
eds. 2006). The introduction discusses Locke's chance meeting with Shaftsbury, his time spent in Shaftsbury's 
home and a critical incident in which Locke recommended and supervised surgery that saved Shaftsbury's life. The 
introduction also details Shaftbury's efforts to introduce Locke to English politics and the ideology of the radical 
wing ofthe Whig party. Shaftsbury's influence is highlighted by the fact in 1668, Locke, in his "Essay Concerning 
Toleration" advocated a strong tie between Church and State and the seeming use of coercive means to enforce 
religious conversion. After witnessing Shaftsbury downfall during the Exclusion Crisis and the dissolution of 
parliament, Locke completely reversed course and denounced efforts by government to coerce or cow the public into 
submission. 
25 ld. at 8. 
26 Id. at 13. 
27 Id. 
28 ld. at 14. 
29 ld. 
from the English throne, and contains Locke's justification for "an altogether more radical, 
indeed insurrectionary type of politics" in the face of capricious government. 30 
The origins of Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding are unfortunately 
vaguer, but the earliest drafts of the texts indicate that Locke began writing it sometime around 
1670, well before the Exclusionary Crisis of James II, but still within the period in which Locke 
was engaged in study of the medical sciences. Indeed only two years prior Locke helped draft a 
short piece called "De Arte Medica," in which Locke expressed profound skepticism of the 
various (and scientifically false) theories surrounding the nature of disease. 31 In the piece, Locke 
advocated a purely empirical approach to medical science, rejecting methods that could not be 
reduced to observable phenomena. 32 It is clear however from his writings that the budding 
empiricist found in "De Arte Medica" would inform the remainder of Locke's philosophical 
undertakings. 
In 1783, a member of the radical Whigs plotted to assassinate King Charles and his son 
James, and while the plot was ultimately unsuccessful, Locke's connection to Shaftbury and his 
association with the Whigs forced him into flight. 33 It was not until William of Orange ousted 
James II from the English throne in 1688 and parliament was restored that Locke was free to 
return to England. In 1690, the first copy of the Two Treatises of Government was published and 
around this time the first copies of Locke's Letter concerning Toleration appeared. Locke would 
eventually go on to write two more letters in defense of religious tolerance following vigorous 
attacks by the Oxford clergyman Jonas Proast.34 Following this period, Locke spent the 
30 Id. at 14-15. 
31 ld. at 9. 
32 ld. 
33 Id. at 14. 
34 I d. at 17-18 
remainder of his career advising the government on public policy and devoted his philosophical 
talents to addressing controversies in Christian theology. 35 
PART III: LOCKE AND LIBERAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
Locke's epistemology is premised on the understanding that even though the human 
capacity for reason is profound and distinguishes human beings from all others creatures36, while 
simultaneously being shared in equity by all men, knowledge is not certain and in fact can never 
be certain.37 According to Locke human understanding and reason "comes exceedingly short of 
the vast Extent of things," yet reason was bestowed upon humanity in a share far greater than the 
remainder of Creation, and as a result human beings can still understand some elements of the 
universe despite their inability to have total and full comprehension of all things. 38 Locke states 
that boundless enquiry into the nature of all things, when untempered by the recognition of the 
limited and finite nature of human reason, is dangerous because it leads to absolute and undue 
certainty of knowledge in some and absolute skepticism in others.39 In essence, Locke begins his 
discussion of knowledge with the demand that those seeking truth accept that they can never 
have certain knowledge. 40 
What is essential to Locke's theory of liberal epistemology is his rejection of the concept 
of "innate ideas." Rene Descartes, a Rationalist contemporary of Locke, posited that human 
beings were born already having certain ideas in their minds, ideas neither gleaned from 
35 I d. at 18-23. 
36 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 13 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1690). 
37Roger Woolhouse, Locke's Theory of Knowledge, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LOCKE 147, 148 (Vere 
Chappell ed. 1994). 
38 Locke, supra note 36, at 15. 
39 Id. at 16. 
40 ld. 
experience or the external world.41 Locke rejects this theory and asserts that while human beings 
are born with equal shares of reason, it is truly experience and external stimuli that are the fodder 
of knowledge. For Locke all knowledge begins as an empirical experience of the external world; 
such experience is taken into the mind and understood, analyzed and refined by the mind's 
application ofreason.42 Locke's rejection of innate ideas and knowledge is essential to his 
theory that human beings are born as blank slates, tabula rasa 43, without any impressions on them 
that are not derived from some experience of the external world.44 By rejecting innate ideas and 
embracing empiricism as the only true source of ideas, Locke essentially states that all human 
understanding is dependent upon reason and that because human reason is by its nature limited 
and finite, all human knowledge is subject to uncertainty.45 
In light of Locke's belief in the frailty and fmite nature of human reason and the 
necessary role reason plays in the discernment of all human knowledge, Locke's suggestion that 
all beliefs be subject to scrutiny becomes obvious. Locke states, "Knowledge then seems to me 
to be nothing but the perception of the connexion [sic] and agreement, or disagreement and 
repugnancy of any of our Ideas. In this alone it consists. ,,46 Furthermore the agreement or 
repugnancy of ideas that sustain knowledge results from two human faculties: intuition and 
demonstration.47 Intuition is the capacity the mind to compare two ideas and instantly assent to 
their rectitude. Locke cites mathematical equations as an example of intuitive knowledge to the 
41 D.J. O'CONNOR, JOHN LOCKE 39 (1967). 
42 ld. at 39. 
43 Locke, supra note 36, at 55. 
44 Id. at 39. For a brief description of Locke's arguments rejecting the theory of innate ideas, see Woolhouse, supra 
note 37, at 146-50. For a modem philosophical refutation of Locke's attack on innate ideas, see J.L. MACKIE, 
PROBLEMS FROM LOCKE 202-223 {1976). 
45 Locke believes that all human knowledge is gathered initially from sensation of the external world and that once 
those sensations are contained and ascertained within the mind, they can be further built upon by the human tool of 
reflection. For a discussion of Locke's theories on sensation and reflection in the acquisition of knowledge, see 
O'Connor, supra note 41, at 42-44. 
46 Locke, supra note 36, at 332. 
47 Id. at 337. 
extent that once the logic of math is understood, no other idea is necessary to understand to two 
is less than three, but greater than one. 48 According to Locke, next degree of knowledge is 
demonstrative knowledge, which he defines as all forms of knowledge that do not immediately 
occur within the mind. "The Reason why the Mind cannot always perceive presently the 
Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas is, because those Ideas, concerning whose Agreement 
or Disagreement the Enquiry is made, cannot by the Mind be so put together, at to shew [sic] 
it. ,,49 Where the mind cannot immediately compare two ideas, intervening ideas inform the mind 
and allow it to arrive at the agreement or disagreement of ideas. 50 Locke suggests that to have 
demonstrative knowledge, it is necessary to compare and contrast known ideas within the 
mind-without ideas, even those which are repugnant or disagreeable, demonstrative knowledge 
remains impossibel. 
With the capacity of human error in mind, Locke reminds readers that the greatest error 
in the pursuit of knowledge is the belief that one has certain knowledge that is beyond scrutiny. 51 
According to Locke: 
We should do well to commiserate our mutual Ignorance, and endeavour to 
remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of Information; and not instantly treat 
others ill, as obstinate or perverse, because they will not renounce their own, and 
receive our Opin_ions, or at least those we would force upon them, when 'tis more 
than probable that we are no less obstinate in not embracing some of their. For 
where is that Man, that has uncontestable Evidence of the Truth of all that he 
holds, or of the Falsehood of all he condemns. 52 
Locke in essence acknowledges frrst that no knowledge is capable of perfect certainty and 
second that absent perfect certainty and, in light of the each individual's proneness to error, no 
opinion should be barred from public discussion simply because it is offensive. "All men are 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
sold. at 338. 
51 Id. at 428. 
52 I d. at 432. 
liable to error" and because "[t]here is no errour named, which has not had its Professors," no 
individual may claim superior authority over another in the arena of knowledge. 53 
Locke's stance on the uncertainty of human knowledge and the absence of a monopoly 
over intellectual authority closely tracks Rauch's theory of liberal science. Locke acknowledges 
that human reason, though powerful and given in equal measure to all people, is still a finite tool 
in comparison to the scope of creation and the vastness of reality. By rejecting innate ideas, 
Locke makes it clear that all human knowledge is derived through experience and reflection, as 
perceived through the lens of reason. Locke's rejection of innate principles underscores his 
belief that no individual should have the authority to dictate truth to others: "Nor is it a small 
power it gives one Man over another, to have the authority to be the Dictator of Principles and 
the Teacher of unquestionable Truths; and to make a Man swallow that for an innate Principle, 
which may serve to his purpose, who teacheth them."54 Because man's sense of reason is not 
flawless, all knowledge is inherently prone uncertainty, and, as a result, should be subject to 
constant scrutiny. Locke states that all knowledge begins and ends with the agreement or 
disagreement of ideas within the human mind. Furthermore, his theory of demonstrative 
knowledge indicates his belief that it is through the combination and constant reassessment of 
ideas, especially intellectually repugnant ideas, that knowledge is attained. 
Locke takes the position that uncertain knowledge inherently breeds error, and because 
all people have uncertain knowledge, all people are prone to error. This human proneness for 
error deprives any person from claiming a monopoly on intellectual authority because simply 
put, anyone can be wrong. However, in light of Locke's position on demonstrative knowledge, 
he seems to embrace the idea that there must be an arena of public discourse to vet knowledge 
53 Id. at 461. 
54 Locke, supra note 36, at 52. 
and subject it to public scrutiny. Because all people share an equal claim to a limited sense of 
reason, and because no one person can claim person authority over truth, Locke's public process 
for selecting right knowledge would welcome all individuals to participate. As stated by Rauch, 
the defining characteristic of Locke and all liberalism thus emerges: "rule by rule, and not by 
persons. "55 As a result, all ideas, even those which are repugnant and deemed wrong, have value 
to the extent that they can be used to demonstrate the veracity or error of a claim. In the context 
of speech, Locke would likely oppose content-based restrictions because they deny people access 
to the fodder of knowledge: ideas. Locke holds that no one can be excluded from the public 
process of discerning truth, no matter how wrong or offensive their ideas may seem to be, simply 
because there is always the chance they could be right. Even if they are not right, the 
participation of those harboring undesirable ideas benefits the process because it allows for the 
demonstration of knowledge by agreement and disagreement. While Locke's epistemology 
agrees with Rauch's conceptualization of liberal science and his position in favor of an open, 
public and rules based system for vetting ideas, Locke's stance on speech regulation is further 
refined by his moral and political philosophies. The crux of Locke's opposition to government 
regulation of hate speech is twofold: first Locke rejects absolutist governments as destructive of 
liberty and second, Locke concludes that certain inalienable freedoms are simply beyond the 
scope of governmental authority. 
PART N: LOCKE, AUTONOMY AND THE TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT-
WHAT RAUCH MISSED 
Although Locke's epistemological fmdings in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding roughly track Rauch's market-based model of liberal science (a finding that 
supports the conclusion that Locke would oppose restrictions on speech), Locke's Two Treatises 
55 Rauch, supra note 1, at 60. 
on Government provides an alternative explanation for his likely opposition to hate speech 
regulations: personal autonomy. Writing in the shadow of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan56 and 
Thomas Filmer's Patriarcha, Locke's chief political concern was the breakdown of the rule of 
law, and the rise of rule by fiat and whim in England. Hobbes wrote during a time of political 
catastrophe in Europe and advocated for an unbreakable social contract between men their 
governments. 57 Hobbes' posits that because people value self-preservation above all other 
concerns, individuals, in forming the social contract that provides the basis of their government, 
naturally relinquish the vast majority of their rights in favor of security and stability.58 Hobbes 
perceived of a world in which the threat of anarchy was so grave that no justification could be 
given for revolution, with final preference given to tyranny over lawlessness. In such a society, 
the sovereign would retain the power to do such things as impose religious uniformity over the 
people to prevent social discord and avoid the risk of chaos. 59 For Hobbes such a grant of total 
discretion to a sovereign-be it a king, aristocracy or parliament-was essential to ensure the 
security and tranquility of the state. 60 
Thomas Filmer's Patriarchia, which Locke attacked in the First Treatise of Government, 
made an early case for hereditary, absolutist, divine-right monarchy in England. Filmer rejected 
the idea that men were born equal, and instead assumed that all men were born unfree, with 
government formed not by the consent of the people, but rather by the will and ordination of 
56 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 84 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1650) ("Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a 
time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without 
other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, 
there is no place for industry because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no 
navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious buildings; no instruments for 
moving, and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; 
no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of 
man, solitary, poor, nasty brutish, and short.") 
57 GLEN NEWEY, HOBBES AND LEVIATHAN 5 (2008) 
58 Id. at 7. 
S9 ld. 
6o Id. 
God. 61 Filmer grounded this belief in patriarchy, which he considered to be the natural order of 
civilization-because the original power of all monarchs descended from the rights of the 
Biblical Adam as father and husband, divine-right monarchs enjoyed virtually limitless power. 62 
To this extent, the rights of Adam's heirs (the royalty of Europe) were inviolable, beyond 
reproach, and superior to all other concerns.63 Filmer argued that a king, like a father, must have 
absolute control over his subjects and that a king's subjects must willingly submit to the plenary 
and absolute authority of their monarch. 64 Filmer concluded that in light of the king' s 
undeniable rights as monarch, the English parliament served merely at the will and pleasure of 
the crown and could be dissolved at the king's leisure. 
Locke directed much of his political writing towards challenging Hobbes' belief in the 
unbreakable social contract and authoritarian government, and Filmer's conclusion that 
absolutist monarchy was the only legitimate form of government. Locke began his assault on 
Filmer by declaring: "Slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man, and so directly the 
opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation. "65 Likening divine-right absolutist 
monarchs to slave-masters, Locke concludes that the natural state of men cannot be thralldom 
because all men are born free, equal in their dignity, and equal in their right to exercise liberty. 66 
In particular, Locke rails against the position that men, born unequal, are incapable of choosing 
"either governors or forms of government" and rejects the view that men are born subjects to a 
king, rendering their consent to rule unnecessary.67 Locke challenges Filmer's position that 
61 Mark Goldie, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT xv, xviii-xix (Mark Goldie ed. 
The Everyman Library 1993) (1690). 
62 ld. at xix. 
63 Id. 
64 Paul E. Sigmund, Sir Robert Filmer, in THE SELECTED POLITICAL WRITING OF JOHN LOCKE 262, 262 (Paul E. 
Sigmund ed. 2005). 
65 JOHN LOCKE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 5 (Mark Goldie ed. The Everyman Library 1993) (1690). 
66 Id. at 7 
67 ld. 
patriarchy is the natural order of man by pointing out that the Biblical Adam was joined with a 
wife, Eve, whose authority over the family and the household was equivalent to her husband. 68 
Furthermore, Locke challenges the view that Adam was granted absolute power as patriarch: 
because God gave Adam dominion only over the physical aspects of the world and lesser 
animals, and made no declaration as to Adam's authority over men, Locke concluded that even if 
monarchies descended from the Biblical patriarchs, their authority was by no means absolute 
with regards to human beings and was constrained by the limitations placed on Adam. 69 Having 
rejected the claim that divine-right monarchies are the natural state of government for men, 
Locke asserts that governments cannot exercise more power than it is granted legitimately. 
Locke's opposition to rule by whim and fiat is deeply driven by his distrust for absolutism, yet it 
was not until The Second Treatise on Government that Locke addressed the question of how 
governments rightly attain and legitimately exercise power. 
Unlike the First Treatise which sought to assail absolutism through theological argument, 
Locke's Second Treatise was a more general assault on authoritarian government and a defense 
of individual liberty through philosophical arguments. 70 Locke begins the Second Treatise with 
a discussion of the state of nature-the pre-civil, primordial state of man when he is without 
government. 71 In the state of nature, man enjoys perfect liberty over his actions, the right to 
dispose of property, and the freedom to live unrestricted by anything but the law of nature. 72 In 
the state of nature, all men are equal in their rights, no man has authority over any other and 
there is no hierarchy or order structuring the interactions of human beings. 73 While man in the 
state of nature enjoys the liberty to dispose of his person and his property without restriction, he 
68 Id. at 8. 
69 Id. at 14-5 
70 Sigmund, supra note 64, at 262. 
71 Locke, supra note 65, at 116. 
72 ld. 
73 ld. at 117. 
is not free to destroy himself, nor is he free to harm the person or property any other because the 
law of nature dictates that men, being of equal rights and freedoms, ought not "harm another in 
his life, health, liberty, or possessions."74 However, Locke recognizes that while the law of 
nature forbids individuals from harming one another, invasions of rights by transgressors of the 
law are inevitable. Because of man's duty not to harm himself or allow himself to be brought to 
harm, in addition to the right to life, liberty and property, Locke posits that in the state of nature a 
corollary right to self-defense exists. 75 This right to self-defense authorizes individuals to 
restrain transgressors, destroy them if necessary and to individually execute the law of nature. 76 
Although Locke paints an idyllic portrait of the state of nature, he states that severe 
inconveniences come from justice and punishment doled out by the victim of transgressions: bias 
and favoritism are common to human beings and as a result, disorder is likely to result where the 
executive power of the law of nature is held by individuals. 77 As a result, men form 
governments to avoid the dangers hazarded by the near perfect liberty of the state of nature. 78 In 
establishing government by mutual consent, the only power that individuals surrender is the right 
to enforce the natural law-the right to self-defense. 79 Because in the state of nature, the right to 
self-defense could only be exercised in the preservation of life, liberty or property, so is 
government limited to exercising this power only to create laws and punishments for "regulating 
and preserving" property and "defending the common wealth from common injury."80 All rights 
to life, liberty and property are thus retained by individuals and are free from interference by 
government to the extent government can only legitimately exercise its powers when it to 
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punishes violations of the naturallaw.81 At its core, the Second Treatise recognizes that the 
function of government in a free society must be limited to protecting individuals, their liberties 
and possessions from the transgressors of the law of nature; it is a rejection of absolutist 
government and the realization of a government of limited executory powers. 82 
The rights reserved to individuals living under a free government derive from Locke's 
conclusion that all men have a fundamental and inviolable right to their body, their labor and the 
derivatives thereof. Central to Locke's entire discussion of the role of government in a free 
society is Locke's recognition that "every man has property in his own person."83 Locke 
concludes that in addition to his own body, man has an inalienable right to his labor and the 
fruits of his labor.84 Locke contends that the world was given to man to be held in common, but 
that the act of mixing labor with what was given to man in common imbues in it a new quality, 
making it the property of the laborer.85 Like an individual's body or his labor, property belongs 
solely to its possessor and cannot be taken from him without his consent. 86 The only limitation 
Locke observes on the ability of individuals to remove things from their commonly held state 
and add them to an individual store of property is the requirement that no man take more than he 
can use without it going to waste. 87 However, Locke also observed that if perishable property 
can be reduced to another, non-perishable form then property can be obtained without spoilage 
and without unduly depriving others of what was once held in common. 88 
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88 I d. Locke discusses the use of gold, silver and precious stones as currency. According to his theory, if perishable 
goods are harvested and sold, transforming them into money and non-perishable liquid assets, then the limitation 
against spoilage can be circumvented and property can be acquired without restriction. 
Thus for Locke, the acquisition of property is by means of labor, and property acquired 
and placed in a non-spoiling state can be held without limitation by its owner and cannot be 
taken from him without his consent. The recognition of an individual's inalienable right to their 
bodies, labor and property places a heavy constraint on the powers of government in a Lockean 
world. Whatever laws governments pass and seek to enforce must not trample upon the 
fundamental rights of the individual and must in fact serve only to preserve those rights from 
transgressors. 89 As a result, Locke declares that absolute monarchy is inconsistent with a free 
society and cannot form the basis of legitimate government.90 Rather, Locke embraces the idea 
of the social compact, in which individuals agree to relinquish their right to self-defense, place it 
in the hands of government, and submit willing to the rule of the majority.91 
Yet for Locke, majority rule is a necessary condition to a free society, but not a sufficient 
one. Government's chief and only purpose in a Lockean world is to preserve property from the 
dangers hazarded in the state ofnature.92 In particular, Locke states that governments exist to 
provide commonly agreed upon laws reached by the consent of the governed, to provide 
unbiased adjudicators for the judgment of transgressions, and to allow the swift and unprejudiced 
punishment of transgressors of the law of nature. 93 The limited role government plays in the 
ordering of society ensures minimal interference in the individual rights of citizens, while 
protecting against the greatest dangers presented by the state of nature. Outside of these 
narrowly prescribed areas, the power of government is hugely limited to serving merely at the 
consent of the governed. Where government exercises its monopoly on the right to self-defense 
against the liberties of citizens or in a fashion that is disproportionate to government's duties, the 
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right of self-defense reverts from government to the people and such government is dissolved in 
favor of liberty. 94 
Locke conceives of a government of extremely limited powers and narrowly 
circumscribed duties. In basing the authority of government on the consensual surrender of 
individual right to self-defense by the collective citizenry, yet reserving all other rights as 
inalienable to the individual, Locke signals that a society is most free when it is governed least. 
Yet government is not a vestigial organ for Locke. Government serves the vital functions of 
providing commonly agreed upon laws, and protecting individuals and their property from 
violence occasioned by threats internal (thieves, murders, etc) and threats external (war). Yet it 
is only in these narrow fields that government can exercise its monopoly on the use of force to 
punish or destroy. However, what is most vital to an understanding of Locke's political 
philosophy is the recognition that the center piece of his theory is the autonomous individual. 
Locke establishes that all men have inviolable property in their own person, their labor and the 
derivatives thereof. Such property can be disposed of by individuals in any fashion so long as 
they do not occasion harm to the life, liberty or estate of others. Where individuals do occasion 
such hann on others, government exists to judge the severity of the transgression against 
established laws, discern the appropriate punishment, and execute it in a cold, unprejudiced and 
unbiased manner. Absent such hann however, government is powerless to coerce individual 
behavior. To this extent individuals in a Lockean world enjoy incredible autonomy and are free 
to act in any fashion that does not violate the law of nature. As a result, government in a 
Lockean world would simply be powerless to regulate speech because even its greatest excesses 
do not threaten the sort of direct, tangible hann to life, property or liberty as contemplated by 
Locke. Yet in addition to the inability of a Lockean government to legitimately regulate speech, 
94 Id. at 240. 
Locke would also likely argue for the protection of absolute speech rights to the extent that 
speech, like property, is a product of human labor 
As noted in Part Ill, the ascertainment of knowledge is an exercise of mental labor by 
individuals. In discerning knowledge, individuals engage their faculties of reason and reflection 
to come to truth. In light of Locke's understanding of property as the product of labor and the 
body, it could be said that knowledge is a form of property protected against violation by 
transgressors and interference from government. Read in the context of the Second Treatise, it 
can be said that government exists to preserve the property of knowledge and cannot regulate it 
without violating the fundamental rights of individuals. Additionally, because individuals are 
free to dispose of their property without restriction, it can be observed that part of the liberty 
guaranteed to individuals in a Lockean world is the right to dispose of knowledge as they see fit. 
Such a right would include the ability to express and communicate knowledge to others free of 
restriction. As a result, Locke's primacy of the autonomous individual in society greatly restricts 
the ability of government to act against private liberties, while maximizing the capacity of 
citizens to exercise the freedoms they otherwise would enjoy in the state of nature. Yet Locke 
understood that the limitless expression of knowledge and the diversity of opinions inherent to 
the human experience were bound to breed disagreement. Confronted with this reality, Locke 
espoused toleration at both the individual and governmental level as a solution to a pluralistic 
society. 
PART V: LOCKE ON TOLERANCE-WHERE WALDRON WENT WRONG 
Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration serves as a high water mark in the development 
Enlightenment era liberalism and is the culmination of years of objection to undue governmental 
coercion. Although the Letter does not directly tackle the question of speech, it does address 
Locke's concern with the regulation of individual beliefs and the expression of those beliefs. As 
a result, the Letter cuts to the core of Lockean free speech values to the extent that it discusses 
the power of government to regulate sentiment and the expression of that sentiment. In his 
reading of the Letter, Jeremy Waldron concludes that a Lockean world would readily accept 
regulations on the use of hate speech to the extent that Locke finds "intolerance" to be the mark 
of an uncivil society. Read in isolation the Letter could be construed to agree with Waldron, 
however, in light of Locke's epistemology and political philosophy, it is clear that Locke's chief 
concern in the Letter is the threat of the illegitimate use of force by any institution, be it by the 
government, by a religious body or by individual citizens. Locke rejects forceful religious 
conversion by both the state and by religious institutions, condemns efforts by mainstream 
religions and their advocates to visit harm on the life, liberty or property of supposed heretics, 
and concludes that all religions have a duty to tolerate the beliefs of others to the extent that 
religious institutions cannot actively seek to harm the life, liberty or property nonbelievers. 
Locke argues that the government, as the civil authority, does not have the power to 
delineate the religious sentiments of the governed and, as a result, any attempt to exercise such 
power would be an unlawful use of government's monopoly on force.95 It is important to note 
that Locke wrote the A Letter Concerning Toleration following Louis XIV's termination of the 
Edict of Nantes, a document granting religious toleration to French Huguenots.96 Locke's 
central thesis is that no institution reserves the right to punish individuals for not adhering to a 
particular belief. 97 Furthermore, Locke rejects the ability of the State to regulate religious 
sentiment on the grounds that such concerns are outside of the scope of authority assigned to the 
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government through the social contract.98 Yet Locke's most profound statement with regards to 
toleration reflects his long held belief in the uncertainty of human knowledge: because no one 
can be certain of the veracity of their beliefs, toleration is the only means to account for the 
potential that any religion, even those seen as beyond the pale, could have credible answers to 
major theological questions. 99 
Just as Locke concluded in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding that personal 
claims of intellectual authority are futile, in A Letter Concerning Toleration Locke states that no 
one person can have sufficient enough evidence to show that their religious beliefs are correct 
beyond doubt. 100 As a result, Locke argues inA Letter Concerning Toleration that tolerating a 
plurality of religious beliefs and punishing only those that directly threaten to transgress the law 
of nature (i.e. religions committed to human sacrifice) is the only way to fairly arrange a civil 
society. 101 Locke lays out a series of duties owed by religious institutions to adherents, by 
individuals to those with whom they share conflicting beliefs, and finally by the government to 
all believers. First, Locke states that religious institutions may not visit physical harm upon 
members whose beliefs are inapposite to the orthodoxy of the church, and instead are limited to 
the excommunication of unorthodox members. 102 Although Locke forbids the "rough usage of 
words" in the document bearing the excommunication, he clarifies that this means such 
documents cannot call for harm to be brought against the body and property of the expelled.1 03 
It is this language that Jeremy Waldron seizes upon when he states that Locke would 
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religious institutions seeking to excommunicate heretical members. 104 Read in isolation, this 
prescription against the use of rough words by churches appears to support Waldron's 
conclusion, but for Locke his opposition to the "rough usage of words" is truly a prohibition 
against the use of force by religious institutions and their members. This interpretation reflects 
his position that in a civil society only the government has a monopoly on the use of force. 105 
According to D.J. O'Connor: 
[Locke's ftrst argument] is an ethical argument to the effect that a church has no 
right to persecute anyone. For although a church resembles a commonwealth in 
being a voluntary organization, men do not renounce any of their natural rights 
when they join a certain church; and, in consequence, such organizations have no 
more power over their members than, for example, a cricket club has. The worst 
a church can do to an unorthodox member is to expel him from membership. 106 
As a result, just as the state cannot deprive an individual of their life, liberty or property without 
their consent or in response to a violation of the law of nature, neither can religious institutions 
bring destruction upon supposed heretics. 107 
Furthermore, Locke holds that private citizens are restrained from visiting physical harm 
upon those who hold conflicting religious beliefs. "All the Rights and Franchises that belong to 
him as a Man, or as a Denison, are inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the Business 
ofReligion."108 This reflects both the need to tolerate differing opinions in a free society and the 
law of nature's prohibition against bringing harm to the life, liberty and property of a fellow 
human being. Lastly, Locke establishes a clear separation between the powers and jurisdiction 
of the church and the civil authority. Members of religious hierarchy cannot exercise the 
ecclesiastical authority (to lead and expel members) outside the confines of their pulpit, and the 
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state cannot dictate the affairs, doctrines or dogma of religious institutions.109 Locke observes 
that those of the Christian faith are specifically bound, in keeping with the tenets of Christ, to 
preach a message of peace, good-will and tolerance to their faithfu1. 110 Locke restricts the ability 
of the civil authority to interfere in the religious teachings of individual churches on the grounds 
that the civil authority has no power (presumably under the social contract) to engage in such 
regulation. 111 Ultimately, Locke is much more concerned with the possibility that the State will 
exercise effective control over religious institutions than he is that religious institutions will act 
coercively against individuals and the State. 112 "But to speak the truth, we must acknowledge 
that the Church ... is for the most part more apt to be influenced by the Court, than the court by 
the Church."113 
Locke's greatest concern in the Letter is his fear that government will seek to create 
religious harmony through forced conversions. 114 In reference to the practice of forced religious 
conversions Locke concludes, "I may grow rich by an Art that I take not delight in; I may be 
cured of some Disease by Remedies that I have not Faith in; but I cannot be saved by a religion 
that I distrust, and by a worship that I abhor." 115 Locke rather pragmatically recognizes that any 
effort by either a church or the government to bring about religious conversion will simply result 
in feigned conversion at best and at worst social upheaval. However, this pragmatic realization 
gives way to Locke's understanding that individuals have a fundamental right to be "left to their 
own Consciences."116 For Locke, religious sentiment is as much a matter of personal autonomy 
as is the right to property, and a result such sentiment must be absolutely free from government 
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regulation and wholly respected by both individuals and churches. 117 Nevertheless Locke does 
place some restrictions on the activities of religious institutions and their individual members. 
According to Locke, no religious institution can enjoy the benefits of toleration (i.e. the freedom 
to preach and practice without government interference) that does not grant the same tolerance to 
other religions. 118 Furthermore, Locke rejects toleration for religious institutions that would 
engage in forceful religious conversion were they in control of the commonwealth. 119 Lastly, 
Locke states that the government has the ability to regulate religious expressions that necessarily 
involve the destruction of property and human life or involve restraints on liberty. 120 This would 
include practices such as human sacrifice or self-mutilation. 
Waldron's dependence on Locke as a philosophical forbearer is misplaced and stems 
from Waldron's narrow reading of Locke's works. In essence, Waldron reads the Letter as a 
meditation on the importance of tolerance in a free society and concludes that Locke's definition 
of tolerance would necessarily require individuals to refrain from vituperative or hateful 
language. As such, Waldron concludes that Locke would tolerate and indeed promote the 
regulation of speech to the extent that it is necessary to stifle hateful speech that would harm 
citizens in the commonwealth. Yet throughout the Two Treatises on Government, Locke 
repeatedly states that the authority of government is limited to protecting human life, property 
and liberty from direct, tangible harms. In his political writings, Locke rejects the contention 
that government has the absolute power to regulate beliefs and expressions, and repeats this 
claim inA Letter Concerning Tolerance. It is apparent from a thorough reading of Locke that 
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the ''tolerance" Locke demanded from religious institutions related not to the use of hateful 
speech, but rather to the unlawful use of force. 
In the Two Treatises on Government, Locke narrowly interprets the scope of 
government's legitimate activities and heavily limits the government's ability to use force to 
further its ends. Essentially, A Letter Concerning Toleration applies these lessons to religious 
institutions and recognizes that if the government is unable to engage in the unlawful use of force 
against the life, liberty and property of citizen so too are religious institutions limited. As a 
result, just as government must respect the right of individuals to their life, property and liberty, 
so too much religious institutions refrain from harming the body, liberty and estate of 
nonbelievers for the purpose of conversion. This reading of Locke's Letter echoes his political 
philosophy and is a far more faithful reading of his teachings. While Waldron insists that 
Locke's prohibition on "the rough usage of words" indicates Locke's favor for hate speech 
regulations, in actuality it is clear that what Locke condemns is the usage of rough words only to 
the extent that they inspire immediate violence against the life and estate of alleged heretics and 
presume the power of religious institutions to engage in direct persecution of nonmembers. If 
Locke would not allow the government to engage in such activities for the purpose of 
conversion, it is apparent that in a Lockean world no other institution could wield such power. 
Rather a Lockean society would be intolerant of restrictions on the right of individuals to 
express their beliefs. For Locke, the right to speech does not revolve solely around the prospect 
of discovering knowledge by means of the most socially effective and efficient system. Locke's 
prohibition against the unlawful use of force by religious institutions reflects his position that no 
authority, not even the government, retains the absolute and unchecked right to use force. 
Locke's demand for tolerance in a free society is much narrower than Jeremy Waldron what 
claims. For Locke tolerance merely requires that individuals refrain from the use of force to 
convert people to their cause. Tolerance in a Lockean world demands only that individuals and 
institutions recognize that no one person has a special claim to authority with regard to the 
discovery of truth and that no belief can be held with such certainty that it is beyond scrutiny. 
Lockean tolerance, like Rauch stated, is such that it would allow the Nazi the speak, the Ku Klux 
Klan member to march in parades, and the most hated and despised members of society to 
express their view free from the threat of regulation and censorship. 
PART VI: CONCLUSION 
For Locke, the right to free speech is not derived from pragmatic concerns, it does not 
depend on government for its recognition, nor does it suffer regulation lightly. Rather, Locke's 
stance on free speech is indicative of his belief that human beings have inalienable rights that do 
not lightly suffer interference. Neither Jonathan Rauch nor Jeremy Waldron fully articulates 
Locke's likely position on the regulation of speech in a free society. Like Rauch, Locke 
embraces the idea that in light of the frailties of human reason there can be no such thing as 
certain knowledge. Furthermore, Locke accepts that because all men are prone to error, none can 
claim that they have undeniable authority over knowledge. As a result, Locke's epistemology is 
very similar to Rauch's to the extent that Locke concludes that all knowledge must be subject to 
scrutiny and that no one person can claim special authority over truth. 
While this would be sufficient to show that Locke, like Rauch, would reject regulations 
on speech, Locke's political philosophy provides an alternative explanation for his opposition to 
speech regulation. Locke was a firm believer in the inalienable rights of autonomous 
individuals. Locke posited that when men formed government, they empowered it to act only in 
their common defense. While men surrendered their inherent right to self-defense when they 
formed government, they retained all other rights with the expectation that government would 
work to protect individuals from threats to their life, property and liberty. Locke rejected 
absolutist government and narrowly interpreted the scope of government's power because he 
believed it was the only way to protect the inalienable rights of individuals from unjust 
encroachments. For Locke individuals in a free society enjoyed the right to dispose of their life, 
labor and property without restriction save for the duty not to bring harm to others. As a result, 
Locke would reject speech regulations as an illegitimate infringement on the right of individuals 
to dispose of their lives free from government interference. Locke would not oppose speech 
regulation merely because of his underlying adherence to the principles to the liberal science, but 
rather because of his conviction that government has no right to infringe upon the inherent 
liberties of autonomous individuals. 
Waldron fails to account for Locke's belief in the inalienable rights of man and the limits 
on government in a Lockean society when he concludes that Locke would tolerate speech 
regulation. Waldron read A Letter Concerning Toleration in isolation from Locke's other works 
and concluded that because Locke opposes the use of "vituperative" speech in the context of 
religious expression, he would generally support regulations aimed at silencing hate speech. 
However, read in the context of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and The Two 
Treatises on Government, it is obvious that the true evil Locke opposed inA Letter Concerning 
Toleration was the specter of the unlawful use of force. Locke opposed the use of force by 
government outside of the narrowly circumscribed areas of policing immediate and direct threats 
against life, property and liberty, and as a result he rejected the power of government to engage 
in forced religious conversion. In admonishing religious institutions against the use threatening 
words and violence against heretics, Locke simply acknowledged his own belief that force could 
only be used legitimately in the defense of life, property and liberty, and not for the purpose of 
forced religious conversion. 
Ultimately, Waldron read Locke's demand for tolerance too broadly. While Waldron 
concludes that tolerance demands the regulation of hateful speech, Locke's definition of 
tolerance is extraordinarily narrow. Lockean tolerance merely asks that individuals in a free 
society refrain from acts of violence against the life, property and liberty of those with whom 
they disagree. Like Rauch, Locke asks that individuals recognize that no "truth," no matter how 
firmly held, is beyond scrutiny and that no person has special authority over the discovery of 
truth. Locke would not tolerate regulations on hate speech to the extent that they unduly 
interfere with the inherent rights of individuals to express their beliefs. For Locke, to silence a 
speaker merely because of the effect of his speech or its obnoxious qualities is not merely 
harmful to free public discourse and the discernment of knowledge, but is damning to the 
inherent right of autonomous individuals to dispose of their lives free from restriction. 
